GREENLIFE ENERGY SOLUTIONS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER FINDING MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS by Ellerbee, Kelly Lee
Georgia State University College of Law 
Reading Room 
Georgia Business Court Opinions 
12-18-2020 
GREENLIFE ENERGY SOLUTIONS ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER FINDING MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS 
Kelly Lee Ellerbee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, and the Contracts Commons 
Fulton County Superior Court
*““EFILED**QW
Date: 12/18/2020 3:05 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk





























ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ORDER FINDING MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONIN
LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant McCormack Baron Salazar,
Inc.’s (“MBS”’s) Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 28, 2020,
Defendants Vince Bennett, Kevin McCormack, Tony Salazar, Richard Baron,
Hillary Zimmerman, and Michael Duffy’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
September 28, 2020, and Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's
Expert Witness, filed September 28, 2020. Having reviewed the record and
considered the arguments of counsel on December 16, 2020, the Court enters the
following order.
1. Standard of Review
In Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 2020 WL 5883344, at *3 (Ga. October 5,
2020), the Georgia Supreme Court recently reiterated the “well-established
principles” guiding trial court’s review of a motion for summary judgment. “A
trial court can grant summary judgment to a moving party only if there are no
genuineissues of material fact and the undisputed evidence warrants judgmentas a
matter of law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In reviewing the evidence, a court must
construeall facts and draw all inferencesin favor of the non-movant.” Ward-Poag
expressly relied on Messex v. Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 210 (1985)that further provides,
“(t]he party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts
in determining whether a genuineissueexists, andthetrial court must givethat party
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.”
2. Factual Background
Generally, this dispute concernsthe businessand contractualrelationships of
a developer, Defendant MBS anda general contractor, Plaintiff GreenLife Energy
Solutions, LLC (“GreenLife”) regarding their efforts on a large project seeking to
redevelop an Atlanta neighborhood. This project also involved the City of Atlanta
(the “City”), the Atlanta Housing Authority (“AHA”) and an Atlanta-based
developer Integral Development, LLC (different Integral-related entities collectively
referred to as “Integral”). Employing the standard outlined above, the Court makes
the following factual findings.
2.1. MBS Pursues Atlanta Opportunities while City Seeks a CNI
Grant
 
Defendant MBSis a for-profit developer, manager and asset manager of
economically integrated urban neighborhoods with projects in numerouscities
throughout the United States, and it is nationally recognized for its work. (Roberts
Aff., § 3; AHA Dep., pp. 31-32.)!' Its principal office is in St. Louis, Missouri.
(Complaint, { 2; MBS Answer, §2.) MBS had previously worked with Integral in
the 1990s redeveloping a former AHA housing developmentinto Centennial Place,
butit had not actively worked in Atlanta until recently. (Roberts Aff., 9 5; AHA
Dep., p. 32.)
Beginning in 2013, MBSbeganto actively seek new business opportunities
in the Atlanta area. (Roberts Aff., 6.) In 2014, during these searchefforts, the
City and the AHA werejointly preparing an application for a $30 million Choice
Neighborhoods Implementation (“CNY”) grant. (Roberts Aff., J 22.)
CNI is a HUD-funded program that “leverages significant public andprivate
dollars to support locally driven strategies that address struggling neighborhoods
with distressed public or HUD-assisted housing through a comprehensive approach
' Patricia O’Connell was the AHA’s designated 30(b)(6) witness, and her deposition wasfiled on September 28,
2020.
to neighborhood transformation.’ Because of its comprehensive approach, an
application for a CNI grant must outline strategies in three different areas for the
proposed project including: (1) Housing, (2) Neighborhood, and (3) People. (Id.)
Eachstrategy component must have a designatedlead, and, for example, the head of
the housing strategy is referred to as the Housing Implementation Entity (“HIE”).
(Id.)
Atlanta was seeking the CNI grant to revitalize communities adjacent to the
Mercedes Benz Stadium. (Roberts Aff., § 23.) The primary focus of the CNI was
the site of the previously demolished University Homes public housing
development. (Id.) The targeted neighborhood included Vine City, Ashview
Heights and communities around the Atlanta University Center. (Id.) The plan was
to redevelop this area to include: (a) affordable housing, (b) single family
townhomes, (c) renovation of a building known as Roosevelt Hall, and (3)
commercial and retail space. (Id.) As described by the AHA organizational
“cerepresentative, the Atlanta CNI’s “core mission” was to develop the formerpublic
housing site and “the neighborhood is icing on the cake to complete the
transformation.” (AHA Dep., p. 93.)
2 See HUD Choice Neighborhoods: Overview,availableat: https://www.hud.gov/cn.(last visited November 30,
2020).
The AHA had previously reached a Revitalization Agreementgiving Integral
developmentrights to the former University Homessite, an area approximately 26
acres in size. (AHA Dep., pp. 17-18; Dep. Ex. 56.) The AHA had unsuccessfully
applied for a CNI grant in the past. (Roberts, §.23; AHA Dep., pp. 24-25.) Integral
had been the HIE in the prior application. (AHA Dep., p. 27.) Feedback received
from HUD on the prior application indicated its housing component “was not
comprehensiveor well-defined.” (Roberts Aff., § 22; 3" Patterson Aff., § 15.) MBS
had significant experience working on CNIprojects throughout the country. (AHA
Dep., p. 32.)
In January of 2015, MBSand an Atlanta entity, Friendship Baptist Church,
LLC,finalized a term sheet for a redevelopment project. (MBS SUMF,Nos. 7-8;
Indiv. Defs. SUMF, Nos. 7-8; Pl. Resp., p. 3; Dep. Ex. 103.) There were some early
discussions about this particular project being included in the “Neighborhood”
component in Atlanta’s CNI application, but the opportunity never materialized.
(MBS SUMF,No.8; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 8; Pl. Resp., p. 3; Dep. Ex. 139; 34
Patterson Aff., § 10; Bennett Dep., pp. 26-27; 53; 86; 102-103.)
2.2 MBSForges a Relationship with GreenLife
MBS’seffort to generate business in Atlanta was led by Ronald Roberts.
(Roberts Aff., | 6.) Roberts focused on new business development, and he reported
directly to Vince Bennett, the company’s president. (Roberts Aff., [ 2, 4, 6;
Bennett Dep., pp. 11,44.) Plaintiff GreenLife is a commercial development, general
construction and engineeringfirm basedin Atlanta. (1Patterson Aff., J 2.) Keven
Patterson is the sole and managing memberof GreenLife. (Id.)
In August of 2014, Roberts began exploring a potential relationship with
GreenLife. (1* Patterson Aff, 4 4.) Roberts had long been acquainted with
Patterson. They first met in the early to mid-1990s at Morehouse College when
Roberts was a student and Patterson was an alumnus. (Roberts Dep., pp. 67-68.)
After Roberts graduated, the two maintained a connection through other alumni and
saw each other at Morehouse events. (Roberts Dep., pp. 69-70.)
In October of2014, MBS and GreenLife collaborated on a coupleofpotential
deals, one for the purchase of Renaissance Park Place and the other for the
redevelopment of Conley Village. (1“ Patterson Aff., {§ 6-7.) The documentation
prepared for each ofthese projects reflected these relationships were intended to be
preliminary and required further negotiation. The Renaissance Parkletter of intent
was drafted by Patterson. (Roberts Dep., p. 148.) It stated, “[t]he parties shall not
be contractually bound unless and until they enter a formal, written Definitive
Agreement, which must be in form and contentsatisfactory to each party...” (Id.,
Dep., Ex. 1, p. 3.) The Conley Village memorandum of understanding,also drafted
by Patterson, similarly provided, “[n]o contract or engagementshall arise until such
parties have negotiated to their mutualsatisfaction . . . all other essential terms, and
have executed a definitive agreementsetting forth the same.” (Roberts Dep., p. 148;
Dep., Ex. 2, p. 2.) Roberts found nothing unusual about these proposals as these
types of documents were often used, “to capture the basic level of understanding of
business terms that would lead to more definitive documents to define the
partnership.” (Roberts Dep., p. 151.) Neither of these two collaborations cameto
fruition. (3Patterson Aff., 9.)
Throughoutthe end of 2014 and during early 2015,the parties discussed both
potential terms of a broaderrelationship and a business developmentstrategyfor the
Atlanta market. (1“ Patterson Aff., §{] 8-10; Roberts Aff., J 15.) As to the former,
the parties and their counsel were negotiating the termsofajoint venture agreement
that would eventually become the Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”). (1*
Patterson Aff., { 10: Roberts Aff., 17.) Asto the latter, Patterson avers Roberts
identified the Atlanta CNI application as an MBSpriority for the Atlanta market and
specified its desire to be designated as the HIE. (3"! Patterson Aff., § 10.) MBS and
GreenLife discussed how they could, as partners, offer an improved housing plan
for the Atlanta CNI application. (1“ Patterson Aff., {J 12- 13; Roberts Aff., J 18.)
On December 2, 2014, GreenLife submitted a proposed Memorandum of
Understanding to MBS (“MOU”)as a step towards the anticipated JDA.2 (MBS
3 The negotiation of terms wasnotthe only issue to address before the JDA could befinalized. Because of issues
involving ownership of both MBS and GreenLife, their proposed business arrangementrequired a thorough
investigation and the approvalofthird parties. MBSis partially ownedbya large financialservices firm, andit
required a thorough background check into both GreenLife and Patterson. (Roberts Aff., ] 16.) Patterson’s wife
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SUMF,No.9; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 9; Pl. Resp., p. 3.). Patterson drafted this
document. (Roberts Dep., p. 175; Dep. Ex. 101.) It reflected the targeted clients of
this proposed joint venture were government agency partnerships, public housing
authorities, and community development corporations and it also included low
income housing tax credit developments underits multi-family housingtarget area.
(Dep. Ex. 101.) However, the MOU makes no specific mention of any project
including the Atlanta CNI. (Id.). The MOUexpressly provided it was intended to
“frame the foundation and basic businessstrategy of the proposed joint venture”but
continued that no binding contract would arise until the parties negotiated and
executed a mutually satisfactory “definitive agreement.” (Id., p. 2.)
2.3. GreenLife Assists MBS with Opportunities Related to the
Atlanta CNI Grant
GreenLife contends, based upon the express oral assurance of MBSofficials
that the two would be equalpartners in the Atlanta CNIeffort, Patterson arranged
an audience with the mayor of Atlanta (the “Mayor”) and various community
stakeholders that took place in December of 2014. (3Patterson Aff., {J 11, 13.)
MBSwasnot present at this meeting. (Id., 7 16.) At that meeting Patterson
advocated as to how the MBS-GreenLife partnership would benefit the Atlanta CNI
was a senior partner with a large accountingfirm that requiredall its partners and their spouses to obtain approval
prior to entering into a business partnership. (Id., {] 15-16.)
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application. (Id., 17.) After the meeting, he continued to make similar appeals to
the Mayor’s office. (Id.)
During this timeframe, GreenLife and MBSwerestill negotiating terms for
the JDA, but an agreement had yet to be reached. On January 21, 2015, MBS
transmitted a proposed Letter ofUnderstanding to GreenLife (“LOU”)that generally
addressed a joint venture agreement “MBSis taking under consideration.” (MBS
SUMF,No.12; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 12; Pl. Resp., p. 4; Dep. Ex. 7, p. 4.) The
LOU’sstated purpose was“to reach an understanding onthe relationship, terms and
conditions under which MBSand [GreenLife] agree to partnerto finance, acquire,
close, construct and operate proposed developments located in throughout (sic) the
Atlanta (Georgia) metropolitan area.” (Dep. Ex. 7, p. 1.) Again, the LOU expressly
stated it was not intended to be a binding contract, and such contract would only
arise with the execution of a written agreement. (Id., p. 4.)
As a result of Patterson’s efforts, the Mayor’s office asked Patterson to
schedule a meeting with GreenLife, MBS, and the Mayor which request Patterson
relayed to MBSon January 20, 2015. (3"™Patterson Aff., § 17.) Again, Patterson
avers he verbally confirmed with MBS that it would be equal partners with
GreenLife on the Atlanta CNIbefore scheduling the meeting. (3" Patterson Aff., J]
23-26.) The night before the January 26, 2015 meeting, MBS forwarded to
GreenLife, a revised version of the JDA for review. (Roberts Dep., pp. 189-190.)
In preparation for the meeting, Roberts internally emailed MBSofficials, a
memo addressing key points about the Atlanta CNI, referencing a possible strategic
partnership with GreenLife to source Atlanta business. (Indiv. Defs. SUMF,No.21;
Pl. Resp., p. 6; Dep. Ex. 139.) The memospecifically noted concernsarising from
Integral’s role in the Atlanta CNI project. (Id.) It also containedthe latest draft of
the JDA that was being negotiated. (Id.) Like the final version ofthe JDAthe parties
ultimately adopted, this draft contains a merger clause and contemplated a specific
written agreement would be required for anyparticular project. (Dep. Ex. 139, pp.
9, 14.)
During the meeting, MBS and GreenLife represented themselvesas partners.
(Roberts Aff., § 23; 3" Patterson Aff., J 27.) City officials asked the MBS-GreenLife
partnership to replace Integral as the HIE, but Bennett expressed reluctance.
(Roberts Aff., J 26; 3Patterson Aff., | 28.) He perceived a numberofissues with
this offer. First, he was concerned about the legal ramifications ofreplacing Integral,
particularly the prospect of tortious interference liability in light of Integral’s pre-
existing Revitalization Agreement with the AHA. (Roberts Dep., pp. 199-201;
Bennett Dep., p. 83.) He was also concerned that simply replacing Integral would
have created a procurement problem. “If [City and AHA] hadbeeninterested in
procuring another developer, there is a formal procurement process . . . we’re
involved in a lot of federal public programs and there’s a procurement process.”
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(Bennett Dep., pp. 83-84). The Revitalization Agreement created additional
questions as to the role of any HIE that might replace Integral. It gave Integral
certain development rights overa key aspect of the Atlanta CNI neighborhood, and
o
CNIapplication’s housing strategy. (3"! Patterson Aff., ] 29; AHA Dep., § 17-18,
23-24, 29.) Bennett suggested and the Mayoragreed discussions should ensue with
Integral. (3! Patterson Aff., § 28.)
After the meeting, MBSprincipals internally traded emails expressing their
concerns about working in partnership with Integral. Based on a prior bad
experience involving a completely unrelated CNI, Bennett was concerned MBS
would be lendingits “resume and qualifications” to increase the appeal of Atlanta’s
CNIapplication but would have no meaningfulrole to play in the redevelopment.
(Bennett Dep., pp. 158-159; Dep. Ex. 10.) Another MBSofficial stated, “[dJoing
the CNI with [Integral] makes no sense . . . This will be a nightmare to manage.”
(Id. at pp. 141-142; Dep. Ex. 8.) Bennett recognized the opportunity presented a
tricky predicament. Hereplied, “[h]ow we respond will go long way towards us
doing other business, in town, but this does not mean we haveto be part ofthisatall
and weare not goingto be in a position to interfere.” (Id.)
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The following day, the Mayor’s Deputy Chief of Staff sent an email to MBS
and someofthe Atlanta CNI key players including Integral, stating, in order to help
insure the success of the Atlanta CNIapplication,
the City has invited the developmentfirm of [MBS]to be [a] central part of
the team along with the City, the Atlanta Housing Authority and our other
current partners. A meeting has been scheduled for Wednesday, January 28"
... to strategize on how wewill partner to optimize our application. With an
application deadline of February 9",it is critical that this remainsa priority
over the next two weeks.
(MBS SUMF,No.20;Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 31; Pl. Resp., p. 9: Dep. Ex. 12.) The
Mayor’s Deputy Chief of Staff did not include GreenLife on the email despite
Patterson’s attendance at the meeting with the Mayorthat occurred the previous day.
(Id.)
2.4. MBS and GreenLife Negotiate JDA while MBS and Integral
Discuss Working Together _as HIE on the Atlanta CNI
Application
Patterson was concerned about the impending deadline for the Atlanta CNI
application and the need to address the roles of any HIE participants in a signed,
written instrument. In a January 29, 2015 email he transmitted to both Roberts and
the GreenLife attorney, Patterson quoted a HUD requirement. (MBS SUMF,Nos.
24, 26; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, Nos. 38, 40; Pl. Resp., p. 11; Dep. Ex. 39; Patterson
Dep., pp. 195-201; Roberts Dep., pp. 220-221; Dep. Ex. 115.) It mandated a CNI
grant application must include letter from each,
12
Principal Team Member... certifying it commits to specific duties and
responsibilities corresponding to the Housing, People and Neighborhood
components of the Transformation Planforat least the grant term. Each of the
duties and responsibilities should must be described in theletter.
It further stated,
 
[i]f any Principal Team Memberis a joint venture made up of two or more
entities, the joint venture’s letter should also certify that a contract(s)
governing the rights and responsibilities of the parties is in legal force and
effect for that joint venture. . . Each letter must be signed by an authorized
representative of eachentity.
(1d.)
In light of this HUD requirement Patterson asked,“[d]oes the JV have to be formed
for the application or can it be an agreement to form a JV post award.” GreenLife’s
counsel replied her opinion of the quoted HUD requirement indicated “the JV
structure has to bein place”at the time of the application.* (Id.)
Patterson’s email also suggested to Roberts, “we should take the step of
complyingto (sic) the Partnership and JV Certification. I suggest we draft the letter
and a MOU andsendit to [Integral] to sign.” (Id.) From this email exchange, the
Court finds Patterson was aware of the need to outline the roles and responsibilities
of all HIE participants in a signed, written contract that would be included in the
Atlanta CNIapplication.
* The AHA 30(b)(6) representative confirmed this understanding of the HUD requirement. (AHA Dep., p.44.)
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On January 30, 2015, MBScounselsent a revised draft of the JDA with his
comments to Roberts who shared it internally with MBSofficials. (Indiv. Defs.
SUMF, No.43; Pl. Resp., p. 12; Dep. Ex. 13.) Bennett expressed concerns about
someof its terms and noted MBSneededto be very clear with GreenLife about fees
and expectations. (Dep. Ex. 13.) Roberts then provided a detailed response to
Bennett. All parties to this internal MBS email exchange contemplatea prospective
relationship opportunity between MBS and GreenLife. (Id.) None of the MBS
officials who were parties to the exchange intimate there was any pre-existing deal
with GreenLife regarding the Atlanta CNI application. Indeed, Roberts, the
individual negotiating with GreenLife, clarified for the other MBSofficials who
were parties to the email exchange, “[i]t is also important to note fee projects for
new business opportunities targeted in Atlanta with GreenLife that overlap with the
CNIfootprint do not involve deals that involve . . . Integral.” (Id., p. 1.)
Early on the morning of February 2, 2015, Integral emailed Roberts with “an
offer to MBSorits affiliate to enter into a joint venture partnership with Integral” as
the HIE on the Atlanta CNI application. (MBS SUMF,No.30; Indiv. Defs. SUMF,
No.48; Pl. Resp., p. 13; Dep. Ex. 61.) Roberts replied, summarizing discussions he
had with an Integral representative the day before. (MBS SUMFNos. 32-33; Indiv.
Defs. SUMF, Nos. 50-51; Pl. Resp., p. 14; Dep. Ex. 41.) GreenLife is not mentioned
in this email exchange or the summary.(Id.)
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Later that morning, Roberts shared this email with officials from the City and
AHA,stating MBSandIntegral“are working togetherto get the JV structured today.
I’m providing you with our exchange this morning that summarizes our prior
negotiations just to keep you in the loop. We are working to form the JV entity
today.” (MBS SUMF, No. 35; Indiv. Defs. 53; Pl. Resp., p. 14; Dep. Ex. 41;
Patterson Dep., pp. 205-207.)
Later that afternoon, day, Roberts forwarded this entire email exchange —
Integral’s invitation to MBS, his summary of negotiations between the two, the
notice provided to the key Atlanta CNI participants that MBS and Integral are
working to quickly form a joint venture, the plan that this joint venture would serve
as the HIE -- to Patterson. (MBS SUMFNo.36; Indiv. Defs. SUMF No. 54; PL.
Resp., p. 15; Dep. Ex. 41; Patterson Dep., pp. 205-207.) This forwarding email from
Roberts to Patterson included the simple message, “FYI .....” (Dep. Ex. 41.)
On February 3, 2020, counsel for MBS,presented a preliminary draft of an
operating agreement for an entity, MBS Integral UCHI, LLC, that would serve as
the HIE for the Atlanta CNI application. (Duffy Dep., pp. 94-95; Dep. Ex. 62.)
Noting the extreme time pressure created bythe application deadline, he circulated
the draft to MBS and Integral simultaneously, noting it was subject to concurrent
review by MBS. (Id.) Asreflected in the draft, MBS would create a new entity
15
Scholars Landing MBS Member, Inc., which would join Integral as the only
membersofthis proposed limited liability company. (Dep. Ex. 62.)
2.5 Patterson Travels to St. Louis to Discuss JDA and Atlanta CNI
Grant with MBS
 
On February 5, 2015, Patterson cameto St. Louis to attend a meeting at the
MBShome office. Before his arrival, Roberts circulated a proposed schedule to
Patterson and the MBSpersonnel arrangingthe visit. The subject line of the email
referred to GreenLife as a “Potential Strategic Partner” and it mentioned the purpose
ofthe visit was to “continue negotiations on a JV Agreement.” (Pl. SOAF, No. 129,
Ex. MM.) Also before the meeting, Patterson sent Roberts an email addressing
“Revised Objectives and Agenda” for the meeting. (Pl. SOAF, No. 104, Ex. FF.)
The final item on this agenda was “Proposed Partnership” and among the topics to
be discussed under that item were “Partnership Agreement/Structure” and “CNI
Agreement.” (Id.)
Patterson asserts the purpose of the St. Louis meeting wasto, “finalize our
discussions asthey related to the Atlanta CNI Partnership and, separately, the Joint
Development Agreement.” (3Patterson Aff., J 33.) At that time, Patterson
considered a verbal Atlanta CNI agreementhad already been reached between MBS
and GreenLife while their written JDA wasin the final negotiation and drafting
stages. (Id. at {J 34-35.) As to the Atlanta CNI agreement, Patterson avers that he
had detailed discussions with several MBSofficials during his St. Louis visit. (Id.
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at 735.) “In each conversation, we discussed this in terms of being equal partners,
with the division or [sic] responsibilities consistent with what wasbeingfinalized in
the Joint Development Agreement.” (Id.)
After leaving St. Louis, Patterson sent an email to MBS thanking them for
hosting the visit. He stated,
I would welcomethe opportunity to establish a collaborative relationship with
our companies. If you also feel there is mutually beneficial value in our
proposedrelationship, please forward me your mostrecent version of the JV
agreement for my review. I look forward to the potential opportunity to work
with you and your team.
(MBS SUMFNo.41; Indiv. Defs. SUMFNo.60; PI. Resp., p. 17; Dep. Ex. 44.) The
email makes no mention of any pre-existing relationship with MBS including an
agreement about the Atlanta CNI application.
2.6 MBS Agrees to Serve as HIE with Integral and Finalizes JDA
with GreenLife
On February 5, 2015, the same day as Patterson’s meeting with MBSin St.
Louis, MBSandIntegral provided the AHA with a certification that their newly
formedentity would serve as the HIE for the Atlanta CNI application. (MBS SUMF
42; Indiv. Defs. SUMF No.61, PI. Resp., p. 17; Dep. Ex. 15.) Thecertification
expressly provided any redevelopmentof the area designated as University Homes
development property would be subject to the prior Revitalization Agreement
between Integral and AHA.(Id.; Dep. Ex. 15, p. 3.)
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As of February 6, 2015, MBSandIntegral continued to work on an operating
agreement for the new joint venture entity. (MBS SUMF,No. 43-44; Indiv. Defs.
SUMF, No. 63-64; Pl. Resp., p. 18; Dep. Ex. 16.) However, the parties lacked
adequate time to negotiate, and specific questions about their roles and
responsibilities had yet to be decided, so MBSandIntegral were also working on a
“side letter” intended to create a framework for more specific talks that would occur
after the application. (Id.)
In an early morning email, dated February 7, 2015, Roberts provided Atlanta
CNI key players with a detailed update regarding these negotiations, opining the
operating agreement would soonbefinalized. (MBS SUMFNo.45-46;Indiv. Defs.
SUMEFNo.65-66; Pl. Resp., p. 18; Dep. Ex. 19.) The update made no mention of
GreenLife’s participation in the HIE. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Roberts forwarded
that same email to Patterson. (Id.) His accompanying message to Patterson
indicated MBS sought to avoid any discord that existed between the City and
Integral and stated MBS wanted GreenLife to be its local partner to “deal with the
local (political) dynamic. Let me know if you have questions or thoughts.” (Id.)
In an affidavit prepared earlyin the litigation, Roberts averred Patterson did
not become awareofthe operating agreement,the sideletter or their terms until April
of 2015. (Roberts Aff, 4 34.) Patterson has also averred that in April of 2015, he
was“stunnedto learn” GreenLife wasnotidentified on the Atlanta CNI application.
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(3Patterson Aff., § 40.) He refers to the operating agreementand side letter
between MBSandIntegral as a “secret side deal.” (1Patterson Aff., J 23.)
However, in responding to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment,
Patterson has acknowledged the February 7, 2015 email chain was forwardedto him.
(MBS SUMF,No.45;Indiv. Def. SUMF, No. 65, Pl. Resp., p. 18.) The Court finds,
through this February 7, 2015 email, GreenLife was made aware MBSandIntegral
werein the final stages of negotiating the operating agreement andsideletter.
Later on February 7, 2015, after the email exchange, the operating agreement
andside letter were finalized. (Indiv. Defs. SUMF, Nos. 67-68; PI. Resp., p 18.)
The Atlanta CNI application was submitted to HUD on February 7, 2015, and it
contained the February 5, 2015 written certification, referenced above, that MBS-
Integral UCNI, LLC would serve as the HIE. (MBS SUMFNo.47; Indiv. Defs.
SUMFNo.70; PI. Resp., p. 19; AHA Dep., pp. 53-54; Dep. Ex. 15.)
MBSand GreenLife continued discussions regarding their JDA. On February
11, 2015, as the final drafts were being exchanged, Roberts told Patterson that MBS
added a term that the JDA was non-exclusive. (MBS SUMF,No.48; Indiv. Defs.
SUMF,No.71; Pl. Resp., p. 19.) He explained this additional term was prompted
by “the prior Friendship and Integral dealings ahead ofan MBS/GreenLife JV.” (Id.)
> While finalized on February 7, 2015, the operating agreementreflects an effective date of February 3, 2015.
(Dep. Ex. 18.)
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MBSand GreenLife signed the final version of the JDA later that day. (MBS
SUMFNo.50;Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 72; Pl. Resp., p. 20; Dep. Ex. 136.)
The JDA makes no mention of the Atlanta CNI project or partnership. It
begins with several prefatory recitals. As for its subject matter, the JDA provides:
MBSand GreenLife desire to collaborate on multiple real estate development
projects in the Metropolitan Statistical Area ofAtlanta, but not on an exclusive
basis. The real estate projects will consist of: (i) affordable and workforce tax
credit multifamily residential housing projects, (ii) non tax credit residential
housing projects, (iii) general commercial and retail developments with and
without secured parking, and (iv) other types of projects.
(JDA, Recital A, p. 1.) As for its scope, the JDA refers only generally to projects
and contemplates a separate and specific owner’s agreement for any particular
project the parties agree upon. (JDA, Recital C., p. 1.) MBS describes this type of
agreementasa “normal process between MBSandpotential local partners exploring
the feasibility of potential projects.” (MBS MSJBrief, p. 13; Bennett Dep., pp. 199-
200.)
The JDA contains a mergerclause, indicating the contract, “represents all of
the agreements between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof as of
[February 11, 2015], and no alteration or modification shall be binding unless in
writing signed by both parties.” (JDA,§14.)
© Dep. Ex. 20 and Dep. Ex. 136 are copies ofthe fully executed JDA and subsequentrecordcites to this document
will be referred to as the JDA.
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In April of2015, Patterson claimshe first learned the Atlanta CNI application
did not list GreenLife as a formal member of the HIE. (3"! Patterson Aff., 4 40.)
Patterson states, “[a]t this point, there wasno real option for GreenLife but to voice
my deep concern about how MBShadtreated me,but to also try to salvageall ofthe
considerable effort I have been putting into the Green-Life-MBSpartnership.” (Id.
at J 41.)
2.7 After Atlanta CNI Application Submitted, MBS and Integral
Struggle to Define Roles
The housing strategy componentofthe Atlanta CNI application contemplated
a number of projects. As described by an Integral representative, “[p]arts of the
[housing strategy] were detailed. Parts weren’t.” (Wilbon Dep., p. 130.) The parts
involving redevelopment of the former University Homes location, generally
referred to as “on-site” development, were detailed and included specified targets.
(Id. at pp. 30, 130.) However, the housing strategy for the “off-site” areas in other
parts of the neighborhood were “speculative” as locations had yet to be selected
where the redevelopment would occur. (Id. at pp. 129-130.)
After the application was submitted, MBSandIntegral struggled to formally
allocate their HIE roles and responsibilities. Integral’s prior Revitalization
Agreement with the AHA complicated matters. (Fitzgerald Dep., p. 58.) MBS had
no ability to develop the more lucrative multi-family developments planned for the
on-site area absent Integral’s consent which Integral steadfastly refused to grant.
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(Fitzgerald Dep., pp. 58; 95-96; Wilbon Dep., p. 14, 29.) On July 7, 2015, AHA
called for a meeting “with a goal of resolving the issues” as HUD would soon be
conductinga site visit, and the AHA neededto “be able to articulate” the division of
responsibilities. (Fitzgerald Dep., p. 60; AHA Dep., p. 65; 1* Patterson Aff., 4.28
Ex, 2.) Patterson actively participated in these discussions. (1‘ Patterson Aff., J
28-32.) On August 6, 2015, Integral and MBSfinally agreed upon a term sheet
although it was backdated to July 27, 2015 (“Term Sheet”). (MBS SUMF,No. 54;
Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 78; Pl. Resp., p. 21; Dep. Ex. 21.)
Pursuant to the Term Sheet, Integral would perform most “on-site”
development and “shall serve as the exclusive master developer” for two phases
involving multi-family rental units referred to as Scholars Landing. (Dep. Ex. 21,
pp. 1-2.) “With regard to those opportunities “all development fees” would go to
Integral. (Id., p. 2.) As GreenLife has recognized, these phases of the CNIeffort
were fully funded and slated to be performedfirst and werethe “most lucrative”part
of the housing strategy. (PI. Resp. to MBS MSJ,p. 16.) The Term Sheet delegated
MBSroles in four areas: (1) general “off-site” development, (2) rehabilitation of
Roosevelt Hall; (3) the commercial/ retail components of Buildings 4B and 4C,and
(4) for-sale townhomes.’ (Dep. Ex. 21, p. 2.) The term sheet provided,that the roles
7 The TermSheetindicates thatthe for-sale townhomes werepart of the Atlanta CNI’s Phase 5 and recognizesthat
only $400,000 of “AHA/Program incomefunds have been committed to this particular phase of developmentand
that there maynotbe sufficient ‘gap’ funding and may require additional fundsfor feasibility.” (Dep. Ex. 21, p. 2.)
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allocated to MBS,“will be carried out by a Joint Venture of [MBS] and GreenLife.”
(Id. at pp. 2-3) It further provided, should MBS withdraw from certain designated
roles under the Term Sheet, “MBS’s developmentrights may transfer to GreenLife,
if approved by Integral and AHA.” (Id. at p. 3.) The AHA wasnot a party to the
Term Sheet. (Id.)
2.8 Atlanta Awarded CNI Grant, but MBS and GreenLife Play Little
Role in the Project
In September of 2015, HUD awarded a CNI grant to AHA and Atlanta. (PI.
SOAF No. 153, Ex. YY.) MBSstruggled to find a CNI projectit wished to pursue.
MBSspecialized in developing affordable multi-family housing. (Roberts Dep., p.
266; AHA Dep., p. 111.) Becauseit could not develop any ofthe affordable multi-
family housing planned for the University Homes on-site being performed by
Integral, it devoted an “extraordinary amountoftime”trying to locate sites suitable
for such developmentoff-site. (Roberts Dep., p. 274.) The AHA organizational
representative testified, “[t]he problem with identifying offsite land in these three
neighborhoodsis there just isn’t much ofit of any scope and scale to build... a
good-sized rental development.” (AHA Dep., p. 218; 237-238.) A Vine City tract
initially offered promise, but MBS determined it was not feasible for a variety of
reasons.®
8 Three reasons why MBSdecidednotto pursue developmentofthe VineCity tract were detailed in a prior discovery
order. (Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents,filed September 16, 2020, n. 1.) First, a
fully functioning post office with a long-term lease would have to be re-located in order to develop the site most
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Patterson claims he was meeting regularly with the AHA to perform pre-
development planning on the aspects of the CNI plan that MBS-GreenLife were
designated to perform, including the commercial-retail developments, the for-sale
townhomes, and the redevelopment of Roosevelt Hall. (3" Patterson Aff., §§] 41-
42.) Patterson claims the AHA wanted GreenLife to perform this work, but AHA
was unable to contract directly with GreenLife because it was not formally part of
the HIE. (Id. at § 43.)
2.9. GreenLife Seeks to Perform Renovation of Roosevelt Hall and
MBS Withdraws from Portions of the CNI Project GreenLife
Wanted to Pursue.
Roosevelt Hall was a unique part of the Atlanta CNI. It remained “the only
building left standing after the demolition of the University Homes which was the
first public housing for African- Americans in the country.” (AHA Dep., p. 73.) It
was approximately 18,000 square feet and included, “a community center that
contained the leasing office, a community room, laundry-mat” and, during its
history, it served as hometo several other businesses. (AHA Dep., p. 74; Fitzgerald
Dep., pp. 30-31.) The redevelopmentplan envisioned it as a community building
with someretail. (AHA Dep.,p. 78.)
efficiently. Second, a pedestrian walkway had acquiredrights to the site, essentially cutting in half and significantly
reducing the buildable area. Third, a large sewerline transected the site and significant expense would berequired to
relocateit.
As the AHA 30(b)(6) representative testified, based solely on the issues involving the postoffice, “[n]obody would
want to develop”the site without subsidies that were unavailable. (AHA Dep., pp. 233-234.) She was unaware of
any current efforts to develop the site.” (Id.)
24
While no grant monies were budgeted for Roosevelt Hall, the AHA had some
funding available for pre-development work. (MBS SUMF,No. 60; Indiv. Defs.
SUMF,No.86; PI. Resp. p. 22.) In Novemberof2015, the MBS-Integral HIEentity
entered into a prime subcontract with the MBS memberfor the pre-development
work on Roosevelt Hall, and, in turn, the MBS memberexecuted a subcontract with
GreenLife. (MBS SUMF, No. 58; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 82; Pl. Resp., p. 22.)
GreenLife satisfactorily performed the work and was compensated forits services.
(AHADep., pp. 85-86.)
After this pre-development work, AHA wanted to move forward “with the
adaptive reuse” of Roosevelt Hall, and, while MBShadnointerest in performing
this work, GreenLife did. (MBS SUMF,No.60-61; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 86-87;
Pl. Resp., pp. 22-23; Dep. Ex. 50, p. 2; 3" Patterson Aff., 43.) The parties agree
that in July of 2017, Bennett advised Integral that MBS was “open to any
modification of the agreement or otherthat is satisfactory to Integral” that would
allow AHA “to contract directly with GreenLife” for this work. (MBS SUMF,No.
61; Indiv. Defs. No. 87; Pl. Resp, p. 23.)
MBSalso discussed the issue with the AHA. In October of 2017, AHA
informed MBSthat in order to transfer development rights in Roosevelt Hall to
GreenLife,
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AHArequires written consent from the MBS/Integral Partnership entity. In
the absence of this, we plan to issue an RFQ/RFPto solicit proposals from
developers demonstrating an innovative and impactful use for the space.
(MBS SUMF,No.62;Indiv. Defs. No. 88, Pl. Resp., p. 23; Dep. Ex. 50.) All parties
agree any transfer of developmentrights would have also required HUD approval.
(MBS SUMEF,No. 64; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No 90; Pl. Resp., p. 23.) Integral’s
consent was never secured. The key Integral official who oversaw its CNI work did
not recall even being asked for its consent. (Wilbon Dep., pp. 132-133.)
This issue involving Roosevelt Hall led MBS to formally change its
relationship with both GreenLife and the Atlanta CNI project. In a March 6, 2018
letter, MBS informed GreenLife of its desire to end their relationship and outlined
what efforts it was willing to undertake to assist GreenLife in obtainingthe rights to
develop the townhomes and commercial/retail space as well as the rehabilitation of
Roosevelt Hall outlined in the Term Sheet. (MBS SUMF, No. 65; Indiv. Defs.
SUMF,No.91, Pl. Resp., p. 23; Dep. Ex. 26.)
On March 22, 2018, MBS confirmed for the AHA that MBS was not
interested in proceeding with these same areas ofwork (MBS SUMF,No.66;Indiv.
Defs. SUMF, No. 92; Pl. Resp., p. 23, Dep. Ex. 27.) At the time it withdrew from
the Atlanta CNI, MBS had performed some planning work but had not broken
ground on any project. (Wilbon Dep., p. 101.)
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In light of the changed circumstances, on March 28, 2018, the AHA informed
GreenLife that, even if Integral were to consent, it would not transfer MBS
developmentrights in Roosevelt Hall directly to GreenLife and would, instead, issue
a request for proposals, inviting GreenLife to submit one. (MBS SUMF, No. 67;
Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 93; PI. Resp., p. 24; Dep. Ex. 28.) The AHA was concerned
that awarding the contract to GreenLife without competitive bidding could violate
procurement laws. (AHA Dep., pp. 95-96.)
GreenLife provided the only response to the Roosevelt Hall RFP which the
AHArejected. (MBS SUMFNos.69-70; Indiv. Defs. Nos. 95-96; PI. Resp., p. 24;
Dep. Ex. 154-155.) Patterson avers a fear of litigation prompted the denial. (3
Patterson Aff. § 46.) However, the AHA provided detailed testimony on the
evaluation process and the reasons whyit did not accept the GreenLife’s proposal.
(AHA Dep., pp. 98-108.) Because of Roosevelt Hall’s envisioned purpose as a
community center, the AHA wasnot looking for a contractor but for a developer
who would own and operate the facility, providing viable programing for the
community’s benefit. The AHA panel reviewing the GreenLife submission gaveit
poor marks. (Id., pp. 101-102.) One evaluator found GreenLife lacked the
“expertise to carry this kind of very specialized community driven operation.” (Id.,
p. 101.) Ultimately, AHA decided to do the preliminary design workitself. (Id., p.
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202.) The record reflects it wasstill looking for a party to develop and operate
Roosevelt Hall. (Id., p. 201.)
3. Procedural Posture
GreenLife filed its complaint on July 2, 2018 naming Defendants MBS,
several MBSofficials in their individual capacities, MBS-Integral UCNI, LLC who
was the HIE, and Scholars Landing MBS Member,Inc., who was the MBS member
ofthe HIE. On February 4, 2019, the Court issued an Order on Motions to Dismiss,
dismissing certain claims andthe latter two HIE-entity Defendants.
On October 31, 2019, GreenLife filed an Amended Complaint which asserts
claims for breach of contract (count one) and breach offiduciary duty (count four)
against MBSand claims for fraud (count two), negligent misrepresentation (count
three), punitive damages (count five) and attorney’s fees (count six) against MBS
and the individual Defendants.
In its Amended Complaint, GreenLife asserts MBS defrauded “GreenLife out
of the very opportunities that GreenLife made possible . . .” concerning the Atlanta
CNI. (Am. Complt., p. 2.) With respect to the off-site multi-family opportunities,
GreenLife claimed, “the developer fees, construction fees, management fees and
other project compensation are forecasted to exceed several million dollars . .. The
long-term operations of the Choice Neighborhood Projects would result in fees and
profits exceeding $34 million for GreenLife.” (Id.)
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The following month, GreenLife selected its principal, Patterson, to serve as
its damages expert. (Pl. Resp. to Defs. Mot. Lim., n. 3, Ex. L.) In his expert witness
disclosure, GreenLife’s damages were estimated to exceed $46 million. (Id.)
According to MBS, Patterson’s most recent summary of GreenLife’s damages
exceeds $70 million. (Defs. Mot. Lim., pp. 1-2.)
At the conclusion of an extensive discovery period, the Defendantsfiled the
present motions seeking summary judgmenton all claims and a motion in limine to
exclude Patterson’s expert damages testimony.
4. Analysis
4.1 Breach of Contract
4.1.1 Count I- Breach ofOral Partnership Agreement
GreenLife claims it had an oral agreement with MBSto form a partnership
that was reached before the January 26, 2015 meeting with the Mayor. (Am. Compl.
4 85.) GreenLife alleges this partnership agreement arose between the two, “by
virtue ofthe circumstances, work they had performed,representations they had made
to one another, and their collective understanding of their working relationship.”
(Id.) Specifically, GreenLife contends the two entities agreed they would be equal
partners and jointly pursue any opportunities emanating from the meeting, and,
during the meeting, the Mayor offered the opportunity for the MBS-GreenLife
partnership to serve as the HIE. (Pl. SOAF ff 81-82; 1° Patterson Aff., J 19; 3"
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Patterson Aff, § 28.) Accordingly, GreenLife asserts the purported partnership
agreement was breached because MBS excluded GreenLife from formally
participating in the HIE. As result, GreenLife claims it was damaged becauseit
lost the ability to directly work on a numberofprojects after the Atlanta CNI grant
was awarded,particularly the projects awarded to MBSthat MBShadnointerestin
pursuing. (Pl. Resp. to MBS MSJ,p. 16.)
Georgia does recognize partnerships may be created by implication. As
addressed in Wimpyv. Martin, 356 Ga. App. 55, 57 (2020),
[a] partnership can result from a contract, which may be either express
or implied. Factors that indicate the existence of a partnership include a
commonenterprise, the sharing ofrisk, the sharing of expenses, the sharing
of profits and losses, a joint right of control over the business, and a joint
ownership of capital. But the true test to determine whether a partnership has
been created is the intention of the parties. The language which the parties
used in making the contract is to be looked to in determining what their
intention was, which when ascertained will prevail over all other
considerations.
Here, regarding the key factor of intent, the Court finds insufficient evidence
MBSand GreenLife intended to create a partnership regarding the Atlanta CNI on
or before January 26, 2015. The record includes evidence GreenLife and MBS both
referred to each other as partners during this meeting and thereafter. However,
“[nJomenclature is not dispositive.” Jerry Dickerson Presents, Inc. v. Concert/S.
Chastain Promotions, 260 Ga. App. 316, 323 (2003). Dickerson affirmedthetrial
court’s grant of a summaryjudgmenton claimsarising from an implied partnership.
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It determined labeling someoneas a partner, “does not by itself demonstrate the
existence of a legal ‘partnership’ and all the rights and obligations engendered
thereby.” Id. at 322-323. Recently, in Wright v. Scales 925 Atlanta, LLC, 761 F.
App’x 884, 888 (11" Cir. 2019), the 11" Circuit, applying Georgiathe
grant of summary judgment against similar claims premised on an implied
partnership. In Wright, the party disputing the partnership had previously described
his purported partner as a partner on a social media platform and in communications
with others. The 11" Circuit found this use of the “partner”label was insufficient to
legally establish a partnership, “particularly when that label is used colloquially, as
it was here.” Id.
GreenLife argues, “[w]here parties ‘distinctly agree among themselves to
becomepartners, there is no reason whythe law should nottake them at their word,
even though the agreement falls short of the facts from which the law would have
otherwiseinferred a partnership.”” Durkin v. Platz, 920 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1334-1335
(N.D. Ga. 2013) citing Accolades Apartments, L.P. v. Fulton Cty., 279 Ga. 257
(2005). In Durkin, the parties executed a written contract agreeing they would own
a moviescriptin “full partnership” and would be “active partners.” Id. at 1323. In
Accolades, the parties “evidenced their intention to form a partnership by publicly
filing a statement ofpartnership pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-8-10.1.” Id. at 286. In
both thesesituations, the parties took formal legal steps — signing contractsandfiling
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public statements attesting to their relationship aspartners so that the appellate courts
found it appropriate to hold those disputing partnership to their word. Here, the
Court findsthe parties’ description of their partnership is informal and casual.
In considering the other evidence ofintent, the Court cannot ignore the various
letters of intent and memorandaof understanding shared betweenthe parties in the
period leading up to the January 26, 2015 meeting with the Mayor, some of which
contemplated specific projects and some of which contemplated the JDA. In all of
these documents, whether drafted by GreenLife or MBS,these parties expressed the
clear intent that their discussions regarding any endeavorwere preliminary and no
binding agreement would arise absent the execution of a written agreement.
Finally, evidence regarding Patterson’s February 5, 2015 visit to St. Louis
reflects his understanding that any Atlanta CNI partnership with MBS wasnot yet
final. The agenda that Patterson provided MBSprior to the meeting placed the
Atlanta CNI project under the “Proposed Partnership” heading. The thank you
email he wrote to MBS after the visit unequivocally indicates he considered
GreenLife’s relationship with MBSto be prospective. Patterson stated he, “would
welcome the opportunity to establish a collaborative relationship with our
companies.” (MBS SUMF,No.41; Indiv. Defs. SUMF, No. 60; Pl. Resp., p. 17;
Dep. Ex. 44 (emphasis added).) He questioned whether MBSalso perceived there
was, “mutually beneficial value in our proposed relationship.” (Id. (emphasis
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added).) He looked, “forward to the potential opportunity to work with [MBS].”
(Id. (emphasis added).)
MBSasserts the record contains no evidenceofthe otherfactors that support
existence=
the sharing of expenses, the sharingofprofits and losses, a joint right of control over
the business, and a joint ownership of capital. Rather than address this argument
directly, GreenLife generally claims that the Court may look to Georgia’s Uniform
Partnership Act, O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et seq. as a “gapfiller” to supply any missing
terms in the alleged partnership agreement. (PI. Resp. to MBS, MSJ, p. 21.) The
Court finds this argument unavailing. Here, the question before the Court does not
concern the precise terms of a partnership agreement where the roles and
responsibilities have beenill-defined, a situation where such “gap filling” might be
appropriate. Rather, the Court is considering whether a partnership even exists, and,
until a partnership has beenestablished, any default provisions found in the Uniform
Partnership Act are inapplicable.
In an affidavit, Patterson claimed that during his visit to the MBS homeoffice
in St. Louis, he specifically discussed terms of the partnership with various MBS
officials, including most of the individual Defendants. (3" Patterson Aff., 935.) He
avers they all responded encouragingly in these talks in which GreenLife and MBS
“discussed this in terms of being equal partners, with the division [of]
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responsibilities consistent with what wasbeing finalized in the Joint Development
Agreement.” (Id.) However,at that time the JDA hadyetto be finalized. Moreover,
even the version of the JDA being discussed at that time expressly provided it was
intended as a framework for negotiations regarding future projectsand=
such project, the parties would enter into a specific agreement. (JDA, Recital C,p.
1.) The contract is premised on the notion that individual development projects
would require unique terms. Thus, the Court finds it would be contrary to the very
terms of the JDA to use it as evidence of the terms of an unwritten partnership
agreement for a specific development endeavor.
Finally, to the extent any partnership did arise between MBSand GreenLife
in late January of2015, the Court finds it was supplanted on February 11, 2015 when
the parties executed the JDA. Without referencing the Atlanta CNIapplication,the
JDA broadly outlined the types of projects the two would collaborate on in the
Atlanta area, and it expressly addressed the types of projects encompassed by the
Atlanta CNI application -- affordable multi-family residential housing, other types
of residential housing as well as general commercialandretail development. (JDA,
Recital A, p. 1.) The JDA expressly provides that it “represents all of the
agreements between the Parties with respect to” its delineated subject matter as of
its February 11, 2015 effective date (JDA, §14 (emphasis added).) “When one has
entered a contract with a binding and comprehensive mergerclause, any reliance
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upon precontractual representations is, generally speaking, unreasonable as a matter
of law.” Villalobos v. Atlanta Motorsports Sales, LLC, 355 Ga. App. 339, 345
(2020) citing Raysoni v. Payless Auto Deals, LLC, 296 Ga. 156, 157 (2014)
(addressing merger clause in context of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations that
precededthe contract).
As the Court has determined no partnership agreement exists, summary
judgmentis merited on Plaintiff's claim for breach ofthis alleged contract.
4.1.2. Count I - Breach ofJDA
Asoutlined in the Amended Complaint, GreenLife’s allegations regarding
how MBSbreached the JDA are vaguely stated. The only breach specified in the
Complaint, occurred when MBAfailed “to include GreenLife in the MBS-Integral
entity that would become the [HIE].” (Am. Complaint, § 86.)
The negotiations between MBSand Integral regarding the HIE occurred in
early February, and they agreed upon an operating agreement andside letter on
February 7, 2015. The Atlanta CNI application containing those documents was
submitted to HUD onorbefore the February 9, 2015 deadline. GreenLife and MBS
werestill negotiating material terms to the JDA -- particularly, its exclusivity -- on
February 11, 2015, the day it was signed. “The consentofthe parties being essential
to a contract, until each has assented toall the terms, there is no binding contract. .
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.”0.C.G.A. § 13-3-2. The Court finds MBS could not have breached the JDA before
it became binding on February 11, 2015.
GreenLife’s Amended Complaintalludes to but does not detail other breaches
of the JDA. (Am. Complt., § 86.) In response to the MBS summary judgment
motion, it directs the Court to consider its response to an interrogatory where it
“identified twenty different breaches that existed as of the time MBSsigned the
JDA, none of which are addressed or even mentioned in Defendants’ briefing. This
evidence of breach stands unrefuted. (Emphasis added.)”? (PI. Resp. to MBS MSJ,
p. 23.) Again, according to bedrock contract law, MBScould not breach the JDA
before it became binding, which occurred on February 11, 2015, the day it was
signed.
The Court finds summary judgment warranted on Plaintiff's claim for breach
 
of the JDA.
4.2 CountII - Fraud, Deceit and Suppression against all Defendants
and Count II — Negligent Misrepresentation against all
Defendants
GreenLife alleges MBS and the MBS officials named as individual
Defendants intentionally made false representations and also failed to inform
GreenLife of material information with the intent of inducing GreenLife to enter into
° Copies of these interrogatory responses may be found as Exhibit C to GreenLife’s Responsein Opposition to
Motion to Compel, filed August 10, 2020.
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the JDA andto assist MBSin securingits position as part of HIE. (Am. Complaint,
4,97.) Alternatively, GreenLife asserts these misrepresentations and omissions were
negligently made. (Id., { 106.) “The same principles apply to both fraud and
negligent misrepresentation cases and the only real distinction between negligent
misrepresentation andfraud is the absence ofthe element ofknowledgeofthe falsity
of the information disclosed.” Bowdenv. Med.Ctr., Inc., 309 Ga. 188, n. 11 (2020)
 
(citation and punctuation omitted.). Accordingly, the Court will consider
GreenLife’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims simultaneously.
4.2.1 Pre-JDA Claims ofFraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
In Legacy Acad., Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC, 297 Ga. 15, 17 (2015), the Georgia
Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding general rule that, “a party alleging
fraudulent inducement to enter a contract has two options: (1) affirm the contract
and sue for damages from the fraud or breach; or (2) promptly rescind the contract
andsue in tort for the fraud.”
GreenLife suggests it is able to pursue these inconsistent tort and contract
remedies in the alternative and is not required to choose oneoverthe other “prior to
formulation and entry of judgment.” Tankersley v. Barker, 286 Ga. App. 788
(2007)(case remanded for election of remedies where party prevailed on both
contract and fraudulent inducement claims); see generally, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(e)(2).
af
GreenLife’s argument misses the mark. The ability to pursue alternate remedies
does not relieve a party of the obligation to fulfill the necessary elements of any
individual remedy it may seek. As discussed in more detail below, there are
provisions in the JDA that render it impossible for GreenLife to demonstrate the
element of justifiable reliance which is necessary to prove his fraudulent inducement
claim. Thus, while GreenLife may pursue inconsistent remedies, it does not have
the luxury of delaying its effort to rescind. In order to pursue its fraud claim,it
needed to promptly rescind the contract which it admittedly failed to do.'°
“Justifiable reliance is an essential element of fraud.” Spivey v. Smith, 303
Ga. App. 469, 474 (2010).
Whether it was reasonable for oneto rely upon a certain misrepresentationis
generally a question for a jury, although in somecases,the answer may appear
so clearly that the question can be decided by a court as a matter of law. For
instance, when onehas entered a contract with a binding and comprehensive
merger clause, any reliance upon precontractual representations is, generally
speaking, unreasonable as a matter of law. Likewise, when oneis bound by a
contract that includes terms that expressly, conspicuously, unambiguously,
and squarely contradict precontractual representations, any reliance upon
those precontractual representations may be deemed unreasonable as a matter
of law. (Citations omitted.)
Raysoniat 157.
'0 Patterson admits that upon discoveringthe alleged fraud, rather than promptly rescinding the JDA,he affirmatively
decidedto “salvageall of the considerable effort” he had expended with MBSinrelation to the Atlanta CNIgrant and
continue working with MBS. (3Patterson Aff., 4 41.)
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Here, Raysoni squarely applies. First, the JDA contains a binding and
comprehensive merger clause where MBSand GreenLife expressly agreed the JDA,
“representsall of the agreements between” them with respect to collaborations on
any real estate developmentproject in the Atlanta area. (JDA, § 14.) Further, the
terms of the JDA contradict the alleged misrepresentations of MBSanditsofficials.
The JDAclearly contemplates the signatories will negotiate agreements with respect
to specific projects. (Id., Recital C, p. 1.) It also expressly states that the JDA is
non-exclusive so that either party was free to collaborate with others on real estate
developmentprojects in the Atlanta area. (Id., Recital A, p. 1.) Accordingly, under
the terms of the JDA, GreenLife’s fraud claim fails based upon the GreenLife’s
failure to demonstrate its reasonable reliance.
Even absent the JDA, the Court finds GreenLife would be unable to
demonstrate the reasonableness of its reliance. GreenLife’s primary fraudulent
inducement claim concerns the “secret side deal” MBSreached with Integral. (PI.
Response to MBS MSJ,p. 28.) The Court finds the MBSdealings with Integral were
not unknown to GreenLife, and the deal was not or should not have been surprise
to GreenLife.
Normally, questions of reasonablerelianceare left to a jury. Educap,Inc.v.
Haggard, 341 Ga. App. 684, 688 (2017). However, “if the record demonstratesthat
the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentations was not ‘justifiable,’ summary
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judgmentfor the defendant is appropriate.” Nebo Ventures, LLC v. NovaPro Risk
Sols., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 836, 840 (2013)(citation omitted.). As recognized in Nebo
 
Ventures,a party has a duty of due diligence to protect themselves from fraud. (Id.)
It relies on Middleton v. Troy Young Realty, 257 Ga. App. 771, 773 (2002) which
held “[f]raud cannotbe the basis of an action if it appears that the party alleging the
fraud had equal and ample opportunity to preventit and yet madeit possible through
the failure to exercise due diligence (citation and punctuation omitted.)”
Here, because of the Revitalization Agreement, Patterson acknowledges
“discussions with Integral would be necessary” concerning the role of HIE. (3
Patterson Aff, { 29.) GreenLife’s own attorney advised Patterson, and Patterson
acknowledged he understood, that a written contract outlining the rights and
responsibilities of the entities serving as the HIE neededto bein placeat the time
the Atlanta CNI application was submitted. (Langford Dep., p. 32; MBS SUMF
Nos. 24-26; Indiv. Defs. SUMF Nos. 38-40; PI. Resp., p. 11.) Notably, Roberts sent
Patterson two different emails regarding the status of negotiations between MBSand
Integral, one on February 2, 2015 email and the other on February 7, 2015. (MBS
SUMF,Nos. 30-36; 45-46; Indiv. Defs. SUMF Nos., 48-54; 65-66; Pl. Resp., pp.
13-15, 18.) Neither email mentioned anyrole for GreenLife in the HIE. (Id.)
The February 7" email, sent in the morning, offered significant details about
the status of the negotiations for the operating agreementand the reason forthe side
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letter. (MBS SUMF, Nos. 45-46; Indiv. Defs. SUMF Nos. 64-65; Pl. Resp. p.18.)
While Patterson would like the Court to focus on the encouraging words offered by
Roberts in forwarding the email -- indicating MBSstill wanted GreenLife to serve
as a local partner — in the body ofthat same email MBSopenly informsCity officials
it anticipated the operating agreement with Integral would be signed shortly. (Id.)
Indeed, the final version wascirculated later that same day. (Indiv. Defs. SUMF,
No.67; Pl. Resp., p. 18.) Finally, on February 11, 2015, before the JDA wassigned,
Patterson was expressly informed that MBS wanted to make the agreement non-
exclusive, specifically referencing the pre-existing relationship with Integral as the
reason. (MBS SUMF, No.48; Indiv. Defs. SUMF No.71; Pl. Resp., p. 19.)
Based upon this bounty of information about the HIE that was known to
GreenLife, the Court finds, as a matter of law,it failed to exercise due diligence in
verifying its status in the HIE before signing the JDA or pursuing any post-
application work on the Atlanta CNI.
3.2.2 Fraudulent and/or Negligent Misrepresentations
Contained within the JDA
In its briefing, GreenLife has also asserted MBS maderepresentations in the
JDAthat it never intended to keep. (Pl. Resp. to MBS MSJ, p. 28.) To the extent
GreenLife is arguing that the JDA itself contains fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentations, as the Court describes above, the JDA provides both starting
point and framework for the parties to discuss specific deals in the future. It
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contemplates specific agreements will be negotiated for any particular project, and
it expressly allows both parties to work with others on real estate development
projects in the Atlanta area. GreenLife could not reasonably rely on any ofits
provisions with regard to the Atlanta CNIproject or any particular portion thereof.
For the reasonsoutlined above, the Court finds, as a matter of law, GreenLife
could not reasonably rely on any of the alleged representations and omissions
underlying its fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims such that both of those
claimsfail.
4.3 Count IV — Breach of Fiduciary Duty against MBS
Thefirst required element ofa breach of fiduciary duty claim is the existence
of a duty. Ray v. Hadaway, 344 Ga. App. 642, 645 (2018). Ray provides such a
duty,
arises where oneparty is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over
the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from similar relationship
of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the
relationship betweenpartners, principal and agent, etc. Such relationship may
be created by law, contract, or the facts of a particular case.
In its Amended Complaint andin its summary judgmentbriefing, GreenLife claims
MBSoweda fiduciary duty based solely on the alleged partnership agreement. (Am.
Complaint, ff] 112-118; Pl. Resp. to MBS MSJ, p. 29.) In light of the Court’s
determination that no such agreementexists, it cannot serve as the basis for such a
duty.
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Absent the alleged partnership agreement, a review ofthe record provides that
MBSand GreenLife did not have the typeof relationship that would give rise to a
fiduciary duty. As fully explored above, their course of dealing reflects that both
entities, whether discussing business opportunities generally orspecifically, plainly
indicated their intent no binding agreement would arise absent a fully negotiated,
written contract signed by both parties. This evidence clearly indicates their mutual
intent to keep their business dealings at arm’s length and fails to demonstrate the
two shared relationship of mutualtrust and confidence emblematicof fiduciaries.
As the Court finds MBS owed GreenLife nofiduciary duty, summary judgment
is granted on this claim.
4.4 Remaining Derivative Claims
GreenLife’s sole remaining claims are for punitive damages and attorney’s
fees. “Because all of [GreenLife’s] substantive claims are subject to summary
Judgment,their derivative claims for punitive damages and attorney’s fees likewise
fail.” Oconee Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Brown, 351 Ga. App. 561, 576 (2019).
5. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, Defendant McCormackBaronSalazar, Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and Defendants Vince Bennett, Kevin McCormack, Tony
Salazar, Richard Baron, Hillary Zimmerman, and Michael Duffy’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Asa result thereof, Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness is MOOT.!!
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'! Because the Second Affidavit of Keven Patterson addresses damages, the Court findsits ruling on Defendants’
summary judgment motions also moots Defendants’ Motionto Strike GreenLife’s Expert’s SecondAffidavit, filed
December 10, 2020.
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